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POLITICAL BALK: OPENING THE DOOR FOR U.S.-CUBA
POLICY REFORM VIA DIPLOMATIC BLUNDER AT
THE WORLD BASEBALL CLASSIC
I. INTRODUCTION
The Official Rules of Major League Baseball delineate thirteen
distinct ways a pitcher can commit a balk,' which generally occurs
when a pitcher makes an unusual or errant motion in delivering
the ball to the batter.2 Although used only a handful of times dur-
ing the roughly half-million pitches thrown in a Major League sea-
son,3 the balk rule prevents the pitcher from intentionally
deceiving a base runner or batter.4 The balk rule equalizes oppo-
nents - batter and pitcher - by requiring consistent mechanics and
allowing pitchers with superior, yet legal, pick-off moves to main-
tain a defensive edge, because base runners are less inclined to
steal.
Distinct parallels exist between Major League Baseball's balk
rule and the "rules" of international foreign policy governing sover-
eign states,5 though " It] he relationship of sport to political ideology
is ... rarely subjected to convincing proof."'6 Ideology is "a system-
atic scheme or coordinated body of ideas or concepts, especially
about human life or culture."'7 States with differing ideological
foundations view cultural tenets, such as sport, with variance: "inter-
pretations of sport and the athletic body vary according to the ideo-
logical position from which they are viewed."8
1. See The Official Site of Major League Baseball: Official Info: Official Rules
of Major League Baseball - Rule 8.05, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/of-
ficialirules/pitcher_8.jsp (last visited June 29, 2007) [hereinafter Official Rules]
(reviewing pitch process that constitutes balk and stipulating penalties for balk).
2. See id. (describing various scenarios constituting balk).
3. Assuming 30 teams playing 81 games (or 15 teams playing 162 games), with
two pitchers per team and an average pitch count of 100 pitches per game per
pitcher, 486,000 pitches would occur in a major league baseball season. See Major
League Baseball - Standings, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/standings (last vis-
ited June 29, 2007) (listing teams and games per season).
4. See Official Rules, supra note 1 (describing purpose behind balk rule).
5. See JOHN M. HOBERMAN, SPORT AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1-3 (1984)
(describing procedural similarities of politics and sport).
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 3 (quoting Webster's Dictionary). "Such a category easily encompasses
ideas about sport, its cultural benefits, and its baneful effects on society." Id.
8. Id. at 7.
(135)
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Much like the batter and pitcher, national leaders prefer a con-
sistent script that allows a degree of predictability. In most cases,
political relations between States typically remain procedurally pre-
dictable;9 however, as in baseball, the potential for a political balk
between differing State ideologies remains.
The United States committed one such errant political move
early in 2006, during the initial stages of the inaugural World Base-
ball Classic ("WBC"),1 ° by attempting to prevent Cuba's participa-
tion in the event. The WBC was the brainchild of Major League
Baseball ("MLB") commissioner Bud Selig, in cooperation with the
Major League Baseball Players' Association ("MLBPA"). 1 The
tournament was modeled after soccer's World Cup and sought to
create a truly "World" Series by featuring round-robin play amongst
teams from sixteen countries.1 2 Every participating team was guar-
anteed one percent of the profits, if any, to be used for youth base-
ball in each team's home country; however, if Cuba won, it was to
receive ten percent of any profits. 13 "World Baseball Classic, Inc., is
the organizing entity of the tournament, which is jointly governed
by MLB and the MLBPA. The entity was established to oversee and
administer all transactions and operations involving the
tournament."14
Prior to the 2006 political standoff between the U.S. and Cuba,
U.S. President George W. Bush's administration pursued the en-
forcement of forty-year-old economic sanctions on Fidel Castro's
communist nation with renewed vigor.' 5 Faced with the possibility
of Cuban participation in the predominantly U.S.-hosted event, the
Bush administration imposed a political blockade upon the Carib-
bean dictatorship's participation, only to be countered by an
9. Although contemporary international political issues would appear to ne-
gate such a laissez faire mentality, a broader inquiry shows that billions of dollars of
international trade and commerce as well as millions of individuals transcend na-
tional boarders almost seamlessly on a daily basis. This expansive interaction be-
tween nations defines the era of post Cold War globalization.
10. See George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; A Shutout of Cuba Would Be a Loss for
the United States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 811 (discussing World Baseball Classic
("WBC") logistics).
11. See id. (describing evolution of WBC); see also World Baseball Classic -
About, http://ww2.worldbaseballclassic.com/2006/about/index.jsp?sid=wbc (last
visited June 29, 2007) (detailing corporate organizing structure of WBC).
12. See Vecsey, supra note 10, at 811 (noting concept behind WBC).
13. See id. (detailing WBC's contract).
14. World Baseball Classic - About, http://ww2.worldbaseballclassic.com/
2006/about/index.jsp?sid=wbc (last visited June 29, 2007).
15. See Sheryl L. Lutjens, Cuba and the Security Frame, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPEC-
TIVES, Sept. 2006, at 3, available at http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/33/5/3
(describing reframed U.S. foreign policy following September 11, 2001).
[Vol. 15: p. 135
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equally savvy political move from Castro, who promised that tourna-
ment proceeds would be donated to U.S. victims of Hurricane
Katrina. 16
Interestingly, the baseball diamond did not present an unfa-
miliar venue for either leader during such political posturing, as
Bush and Castro both share professional baseball backgrounds: Cas-
tro was a former pitcher, 17 while President George W. Bush led an
investment group that bought Major League Baseball's Texas Rang-
ers.18 Furthermore, both leaders previously used baseball for politi-
cal gain: "'massive sport' is seen as 'one of the fundamental
objectives of the [Castro-led Cuban] revolution;"" 9 and Bush cited
his success with the Rangers "in his 1999 [Texas gubernatorial]
campaign biography.' '20
Ultimately, the U.S. conceded and Cuba took the field, finish-
ing second to Japan. 21 Although the games went seamlessly, forty
years of international and administrative policy bubbled to the sur-
face due to the U.S. balk. With the next WBC scheduled for 200922
and the United States vying for hosting privileges for the 2016 Sum-
mer Olympic Games, 23 the narrow issue of Cuban participation in
athletic events held on U.S. soil demands present attention.24
16. See Kevin Baxter & Pablo Bachelet, World Baseball Classic, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 24, 2006, at A8 (noting Castro's political short-circuit of OFAC denial by
promising winnings as donations to U.S. victims of Hurricane Katrina).
17. See Murray Chass, World Baseball Classic, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 21, 2006,
at 1 (describing Castro's baseball background).
18. JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF
GEORGE W. BUSH 26 (2004) (discussing Bush's involvement in purchase of Texas
Rangers).
19. JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 78 (1988).
20. DEAN, supra note 18, at 27.
21. See Baxter & Bachelet, supra note 16, at A8 (reviewing Japan's victory over
Cuba in WBC finale).
22. See Editorial, A Real World Series: Baseball's Best Launch an International Clas-
sic, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 24, 2006, at B6 (mentioning scheduling of
next WBC for 2009).
23. See Philip Hersh, Chicago's Big Olympic Plans, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2006,
available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0607130188ju13,0,
7545525.story?coll=chi-news-hed&?track=sto-relcon (discussing Chicago's bid to
host 2016 Olympic Games).
24. See Ronald Blum, Pound Strikes Out at Decision; Banning Cuba from Baseball
Classic Could Threaten Olympic Bids, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Canada), Dec.
16, 2005, at 2 (discussing necessary inquiry into licensing procedure and subse-
quent implications). In emphasizing the importance of the initial administrative
decision to bar Cuban participation in the WBC, Blum states, "Baseball officials
said they had asked lawyers at Morgan Lewis & Bockius to attempt to have the Bush
administration reverse the decision by the Treasury Department's [OFAC], which
by law must issue permits for certain transactions with Fidel Castro's communist
country." Id.
2008]
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Moreover, because of the inevitably politicized history that Cuban
participation in the WBC implicates, the broader constitutional is-
sues surrounding foreign policy and administrative powers warrant
critical inquiry as well. 2 5
Using the example of the initial blunder at the WBC, this Com-
ment explores prospective changes in United States foreign policy
toward Cuba and discusses how sport can facilitate a renewed diplo-
matic cordiality between these two hemispheric neighbors. Politi-
cally, Cuba and the United States have lived worlds apart for the last
fifty years, despite separation by only a ninety-mile expanse of the
Gulf of Mexico. Perhaps baseball can ignite a unifying political
diplomacy.
This topic is additionally pertinent when considering the seem-
ing inevitability of regime change within Cuba, with the political
standoff surrounding the WBC serving as both an entry point and a
focal point in developing this policy discussion. 26 Furthermore, the
administrative decision-making behind Cuba's participation en-
gages an exploration of checks and balances on executive powers,
including the power of appointment and the appealability of ad-
ministrative orders. Accordingly, a critical analysis of the conflict-
ing discourse between the U.S. and Cuba facilitates reconciliation
of the misaligned sovereign voices.
In order to fully engage in a dialogue concerning legal issues
surrounding the U.S. political balk during the planning stages of
the WBC, the following foundational areas must first be explored: a
review of modern entanglements between sport and politics, a sum-
mary of the current black-letter law of U.S.-Cuba relations, and a
specific focus on the special licensing provisions at issue during the
WBC.
Section II of this Comment will provide the necessary back-
ground for an informed discussion on reshaping U.S.-Cuba rela-
tions, discussing the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Cuban Assets
25. See Oscar Corral & Pablo Bachelet, Cuba's Powerhouse Baseball Team Got the
Sign to "Play Ball!," MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21, 2006, at Al ("[D]espite the resolution
to the baseball issue, tensions between the two nations are likely to continue dog-
ging Cuba's participation in U.S. sporting events.").
26. See Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Hunting for Clues to Castro's Health, http://www.cnn.
com/HEALTH/blogs/paging.dr.gupta/2007/01/hunting-for-clues-to-castros-
health.html (last visited June 29, 2007) (describing poor health of Fidel Castro);
Caren Bohan, Bush Predicts Change is Near for Cuba, Reuters.com - News - World,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKN2836751820070428 (last visited
June 29, 2007) ("President [George W.] Bush took fresh aim on Saturday [April
28, 2007] at Cuba's communist government, calling it a 'cruel dictatorship' and
predicting that democratic change was near.").
[Vol. 15: p. 135
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Control Regulations, the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, the Cuban Democracy Act, and the Cuban Liberty and De-
mocracy Solidarity Act. 2 7 The current U.S. presidential
administration's policy will also be reviewed, 28 followed by a history
of political conflicts in modern sport,29 and the specific licensing
process for Cuban athletes participating in U.S.-hosted events.30
Section III will examine the appealability of decisions adminis-
tered by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control, and criticize the watered-down authority of vital govern-
mental offices via executive appointment. 31 Furthermore, this sec-
tion will revisit Regan v. Wald, the U.S. Supreme Court case that
provides the determinative reading of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act in a historical context of political controversy
and upheaval.3 2 In addition, Section III will discuss the contraposi-
tion of Presidents Bush and Castro, reading their exchanges - both
direct and indirect - throughout the WBC controversy within an ide-
ological lens. 33 Finally, this section will describe potential positive
advancements in U.S.-Cuba policy that could be facilitated with in-
ternational sporting events such as the WBC, 34 demonstrating that,
although the U.S. treatment of Cuba may be constitutional, it is no
longer pragmatic in a modern, post-communist context.
Finally, Section IV of this Comment provides concluding re-
marks and attempts to homogenize a complicated history of diplo-
matic peaks and valleys while offering some hope for improved
future relations between the U.S. and Cuba in the contemporary
economic context of globalization and the martial context of
terrorism.35
27. For a further discussion of these acts, see infra notes 40-94 and accompa-
nying text.
28. For a further discussion of current presidential policy, see infra notes 95-
104 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the history of political conflict in modern
sport, see infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
30. For a further discussion of the licensing process of Cuban athletes, see
infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC")
decisions, see infra notes 133-98 and accompanying text.
32. For a detailed discussion of Regan v. Wald, see infra notes 199-227 and
accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the contraposition of President Bush and Fidel
Castro, see infra notes 228-61 and accompanying text.
34. For a further discussion of possible advancements in U.S.-Cuba relations,
see infra notes 262-79 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of the concluding remarks of this Comment, see
infra notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
20081
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II. BACKGROUND
To analyze the legal issues surrounding the Office of Foreign
Assets Control's ("OFAC") licensing power for foreign participation
in domestically-held international sporting events, an initial discus-
sion of contextual elements is mandatory.36
A. History of U.S. Legislation Regarding Cuba
Some inquiry into the influence of historical climate is re-
quired to comprehend the contextual political climate surrounding
a decision made by the current administration.3 7 As stated by Peter
Goodrich, "[t]he commands and the judgments traditionally
obeyed as 'the law' within a given community must 'come from'
somewhere .... "38 Although this article does not analyze the en-
tirety of the contemporary political context surrounding each de-
velopmental stage of U.S.-Cuban policy, some backdrop regarding
the origins of current law facilitates an analysis of the modern polit-
ical environment,39 as it is impossible to understand the current
policy status without knowing something of its derivation.
1. Trading With the Enemy Act
The United States Congress first promulgated the Trading
With the Enemy Act ("TWEA") on October 6, 1917 in response to
World War J.40 TWEA prohibits property transfers between United
States citizens and enemy nations, unless licensed by the Presi-
dent.4 1 Although originally enacted for use exclusively during
36. Avoiding overly-expansive discussion, this paper does not explain and ana-
lyze the legality of the contemporary political circumstances that led to the current
legislation. It only analyzes the administrative powers' limitation of Cuba's mod-
em participation in international sporting events held within the United States.
37. See PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAw: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LE-
GAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 5 (Blackwell Publishers 1986) (describing notion of
.source of law" underlying current law and entry point for legal criticism).
38. Id.
39. A truly in-depth exploration of modern U.S.-Cuba relations would analyze
the contemporary environment of each legislative development, assuming no neu-
trality at any stage of precedent. This article must assume some degree of histori-
cal soundness in the creation of prior legislation because a full inquiry into the
record is beyond its scope.
40. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (1984) ("[The Trading With the
Enemy Act ('TWEA')] was first passed in 1917, six months after the United States
entered World War I."); see also Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 411 ("To
define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes.").
41. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2007) ("It shall be unlawful-(a) For any person in
the United States, except with the license of the President ... to trade ... with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such other person is an enemy
[Vol. 15: p. 135
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times of war, the scope of presidential authority under TWEA later
expanded to cover instances of "existing national emergency. '42 In
1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delegated licensing authority
under TWEA to the Secretary of the Treasury. 43 Two years prior to
President Roosevelt's transfer of licensing authority to the Treasury,
he created the Office of Foreign Funds Control ("OFFC") to exer-
cise section 5(b) of TWEA.44 OFAC evolved out of the OFFC,45
"created in December 1950, following the entry of China into the
Korean War, when President Truman declared a national emer-
gency under TWEA in response to the threat of international com-
munism and blocked all Chinese and North Korean assets subject
to U.S. jurisdiction. ' 46 As originally drafted, "TWEA gave the Presi-
dent broad authority to impose comprehensive embargoes on for-
eign countries as one means of dealing with both peacetime
emergencies and times of war." 47
2. Cuban Assets Control Regulations
In February, 1962, PresidentJohn F. Kennedy "imposed an em-
bargo on all transactions with Cuba '48 pursuant to the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, which confers authority upon the President "to
establish and maintain [such] a total embargo upon all trade be-
tween the United States and Cuba. '49 On July 9, 1963, President
42. See Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1, 1 ("(b) During time of war or
during any other period of national emergency declared by the President.. .. ");
see also Regan, 468 U.S. at 226 n.2 (discussing statutory history behind TWEA and
corresponding evolution of presidential authority).
43. See 7 Fed. Reg. 1,409-03 (Feb. 25, 1942) ("Memorandum to the Secretary
of the Treasury: All power and authority conferred upon me by Sections 3 (a) and
5 (b) of the [TWEA], as amended, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of the
Treasury.").
44. See 68 Fed. Reg. 4,422-01, 4,423 (Jan. 29, 2003) (discussing creation of
Office of Foreign Funds Control).
45. See id. (delineating evolution from Office of Foreign Funds Control into
OFAC).
46. Id.
47. Regan, 468 U.S. at 225-26 (noting initially broad scope conferred upon
President by sec. 5(b) of TWEA).
48. Ignacio M. Sarmiento, Comment, Traveling to Cuba? Sony, It's Closed, 29
NovA L. REv,. 287, 291 (2005) (noting Presidential Proclamation No. 3447 began
Cuban embargo).
49. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1961). Title 22, sec. 2370, Subsection (a)(1) of
the U.S. Code states:
(a) Cuba; embargo on all trade
(1) No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the present
government of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing and carry-
ing into effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the President is au-
thorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade
between the United States and Cuba.
20081
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Kennedy's Cuban Import Regulations were revoked and replaced
with the Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR") in the Code
of Federal Regulations.50 TWEA conferred presidential authority
to enact CACR.51
On October 15, 1962, the Secretary of the Treasury delegated
the authority conferred to him by the President via TWEA to
OFAC. 52 To this day, OFAC "administers and enforces economic
and trade sanctions."53 The official government website for OFAC
summarizes its duties with the following:
The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the US
Department of the Treasury administers and enforces eco-
nomic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and
national security goals against targeted foreign countries,
terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those en-
gaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and
national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by
specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and
freeze foreign assets under US jurisdiction. 54
The role of OFAC increased in recent decades under the leader-
ship of Director Richard Newcomb, who stepped down in 2004.55
Id.
50. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,974, 6,974 (July 8,
1963) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515) (adopting regulations to control finan-
cial and commercial transactions involving Cuba).
51. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 225 (discussing legislative history behind Regulation
201(b) and TWEA); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1997) (prohibiting transac-
tions with designated foreign countries). "Alternative statutory authority for the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations was found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
.... Regan, 468 U.S. at 225 n.1.
52. See Treas. Dep't Order No. 128 (Rev. 1, Oct. 15, 1962); see also Regan, 468
U.S. at 226 n.2 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1963)).
53. Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness, 329 F. Supp.
2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2004) (defining OFAC's role in "the Department of the
Treasury.").
54. U.S. Treasury: Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treasury.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/ (last visited June 29, 2007) (emphasis added) (provid-
ing OFAC mission statement).
55. See David Ivanovich, Case Puts Agency in Spotlight, HoUSTON CHRON., Feb.
26, 2006 ("Today's OFAC is largely the creation of Richard Newcomb, who headed
the agency for 17 years before stepping down in 2004 .... During Newcomb's
tenure, OFAC's responsibilities mushroomed as the United States employed eco-
nomic sanctions more frequently as a foreign policy tool.").
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3. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
In 1977, Congress amended section 5(b) of TWEA to specifi-
cally limit presidential power under TWEA to times of war.5 6 Simul-
taneously, Congress enacted the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), which granted the President the
authority to use emergency economic powers in times of peacetime
crises.5 7 The IEEPA states, in relevant part:
Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of
this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or sub-
stantial part outside the United States, to the national secur-
ity, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such
threat.58
Prior to exercising authority conferred by IEEPA, the President
must consult Congress, if possible.59 Nevertheless, Congress
reserves the right to enact a joint resolution into law, terminating a
president's declaration of a national emergency.60
To facilitate the use of the presidential IEEPA authority to con-
tinue embargoes, "Congress decided to grandfather existing exer-
cises of the President's 'national emergency' authorities." 6' Under
the grandfather clause, any presidential authority exercised as a re-
sult of a national emergency declared by a President prior to July 1,
1977 may continue to be exercised, regardless of the amendment to
TWEA.62 Annual extension of the declared "national emergency"
56. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 227; see also S. REP. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4541 ("The purpose of the bill is to revise and delimit
the President's authority to regulate international economic transactions during
wars or national emergencies.").
57. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 227-28 (granting authority similar to authority
granted by TWEA).
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
59. See 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1977) ("(a) Consultation with Congress: The
President, in every possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exer-
cising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly
with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.").
60. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (1) (1976) (detailing procedure for congressional
joint resolution).
61. Regan, 468 U.S. at 228.
62. See Trading With the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat.
1625 (1977). Section 101(b) reads:
(b) Notwithstanding the amendment made by subsection (a), the author-
ities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading With
the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with respect to a country on
July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared by the President
2008]
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authority must be in the national interest of the U.S.63 Since
IEEPA's enactment in 1977, however, every U.S. President -
Carter, 64 Regan, 65 George H.W. Bush, 66 Clinton,67 and George W.
before such date, may continue to be exercised with respect to such coun-
try, except that, unless extended, the exercise of such authorities shall
terminate (subject to the savings provisions of the second sentence of
section 101 (a) of the National Emergencies Act) at the end of the two-
year period beginning on the date of enactment of the National Emer-
gencies Act. The President may extend the exercise of such authorities
for one-year periods upon a determination for each such extension that
the exercise of such authorities with respect to such country for another
year is in the national interest of the United States.
Id.
63. See id. (noting requirement of national interest).
64. See Determination Extending the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449 (Sept. 12, 1978), Determina-
tion Extending the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,153 (Sept. 13, 1979), Determination Concerning the
Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,549 (Sept. 10, 1980).
65. See Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading
With the Enemy Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321 (Sept. 10, 1981), Extension of the Exer-
cise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,797 (Sept. 8, 1982), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695 (Sept. 7, 1983), Extension of the
Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 49 Fed.
Reg. 35,927 (Sept. 11, 1984), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities
Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,563 (Sept. 5, 1985), Ex-
tension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy
Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (Aug. 20, 1986), Extension of the Exercise of Certain
Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,397 (Aug. 27,
1987), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With
the Enemy Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 35,289 (Sept. 8, 1988).
66. See Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading
With the Enemy Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,089 (Aug. 28, 1989), Extension of the Exer-
cise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 55 Fed. Reg.
37,309 (Sept. 5, 1990), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,415 (Sept. 13, 1991); Extension of
the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 57
Fed. Reg. 43,125 (Aug. 28, 1992).
67. See Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading
With the Enemy Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,209 (Sept. 13, 1993), Extension of the Exer-
cise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 59 Fed. Reg.
47,229 (Sept. 8, 1994), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,659 (Sept. 8, 1995); Extension of the
Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 61 Fed.
Reg. 46,529 (Aug. 27, 1996), Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities
Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,729 (Sept. 12, 1997),
Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the En-
emy Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,455 (Sept. 11, 1998), Presidential Determination on Con-
tinuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 51,885 (Sept. 10, 1999), Continuation of the Exercise of
Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 55,883
(Sept. 12, 2000).
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Bush 68 - has deemed the one-year extension of presidential national
emergency authority against Cuba to be in the U.S.'s national
interest.
In Regan v. Wald, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the interaction of TWEA and IEEPA via the grandfather clause.69
Donald Regan, Petitioner, served as Secretary of the Treasury
under President Ronald Reagan. 70 Respondents, Ruth Wald, et al.,
were a group of American citizens seeking an injunction against a
1982 amendment to the 1977 IEEPA, which banned travel to
Cuba.7 1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded
that the 1982 amendment lacked statutory authority and remanded
the case to the District Court of Massachusetts "with instructions to
issue the preliminary injunction."72 Although the majority, in a
five-four opinion, upheld the 1982 amendment banning licensed
travel to Cuba, Justice Blackmun penned a strong dissent. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined. The dissent criticized the
expansion of presidential authority under the IEEPA and, via the
grandfather clause, the TWEA, noting the congressional desire to
limit such executive authority that stood behind the enactment of
the IEEPA and the corresponding amendment of the TWEA. 73
OFAC's response to the WBC licensing request for the Cuban
national team, coupled with the Bush administration's heightened
enforcement of foreign policy regarding Cuba, engenders a new
analysis of the legislative intent behind the IEEPA and its grandfa-
ther clause; thus reopening the conflicting opinions of the Regan
decision.
68. See Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,943 (Sept. 12, 2001), Continuation of the
Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 67 Fed.
Reg. 58,681 (Sept. 13, 2002), Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities
Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,325 (Sept. 12, 2003),
Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,497 (Sept. 10, 2004), Continuation of the Exercise of
Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,607
(Sept. 12, 2005), Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,399 (Sept. 13, 2006), Continuation
of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 53,409 (Sept. 13, 2007).
69. See generally Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (interpreting Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") grandfather clause).
70. See id. at 222.
71. See id. at 224.
72. Id. at 225.
73. See id. at 244-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("TWEA emergency authority
operated as a one-way ratchet to enhance greatly the President's discretionary au-
thority over foreign policy.").
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4. Cuban Democracy Act
Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992.74 The
Cuban Democracy Act "called explicitly for regime change in
Cuba;" 75 however, the Clinton administration's approach toward
Cuba "conced[ed]... authority over sanctions regulations to Con-
gress," and was marked by a belief in "people-to-people exchange as
the means to bring change to Cuba."7 6 The Cuban Democracy Act,
although codified, only purports to recommend a U.S. policy re-
garding Cuba. 77 Although critical of Fidel Castro's unyielding
power, the Cuban Democracy Act sought to bring humanitarian aid
to Cuba through food donations, 78 provision of medical supplies,
79
and the introduction of a postal infrastructure.8 0 The Cuban De-
mocracy Act delegated enforcement authority to the Secretary of
the Treasury.8 1
5. Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act
In 1996, the Cuban military attacked two U.S. civilian aircrafts,
resulting in the loss of four American lives.8 2 This incident
prompted rapid legislation of economic restrictions by the U.S.83
President Clinton reactively signed the Cuban Liberty and Democ-
racy Solidarity Act of 1996 ("LIBERTAD") into law, seeking to
strengthen economic sanctions against Cuba.8 4 The LIBERTAD
legislation responded to the national emergency declared by Presi-
74. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1992) (establishing Cuban Democracy Act).
75. Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7 (reviewing U.S. policy on Cuba); see also 22
U.S.C. § 6002 (1992) (setting forth ten policy statements toward Cuba).
76. Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7.
77. See 22 U.S.C. § 6002 (1992) (prefacing policy with "[i]t should be the pol-
icy of the United States ....").
78. See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(b) (1992) ("Nothing in this or any other Act shall
prohibit donations of food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals in
Cuba.").
79. See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(c) (1992) ("Exports of medicines or medical sup-
plies, instruments, or equipment to Cuba shall not be restricted ....").
80. See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(f) (1992) ("The United States Postal Service shall
take such actions as are necessary to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba,
including, in the absence of common carrier service between the 2 countries, the
use of charter service providers.").
81. See 22 U.S.C. § 6009(a) (1992) ("The authority to enforce this chapter
shall be carried out by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury
shall exercise the authorities of the Trading With the Enemy Act [50 App. U.S.C.A.
§ 1 et seq.] in enforcing this chapter.").
82. See Remarks on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 478 (Mar. 12, 1996) (stat-
ing reasons for signing bill into law).
83. See id. (reviewing rationale of legislation).
84. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996) (establishing LIBERTAD).
[Vol. 15: p. 135
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dent Clinton against Cuba in March 1996.85 Section 1621 (a) of the
National Emergency Act ("NEA") provides the President with au-
thority to declare a national emergency.8 6 Similar to the IEEPA,
emergencies declared under the NEA terminate after one year, un-
less renewed by the President.8 7 Since the 1996 emergency declara-
tion, both Presidents Clinton88 and George W. Bush 89 have
consistently renewed the emergency every year; thus, since 1996,
the U.S. has effectively had a national emergency declared against
Cuba. That is, for the last eleven years, Cuba has engendered "[a]
state of national crisis or a situation requiring immediate and ex-
traordinary national action" upon the United States. 90
LIBERTAD "continued the Cuban embargo indefinitely and
effectively suspended the IEEPA's requirement that the President
85. See 61 Fed. Reg. 8,843 (Mar. 1, 1996) (declaring national emergency fol-
lowing Cuban military attack on U.S. civilian aircraft).
86. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (a) (1976) (detailing process for presidential declara-
tion of emergency). Subsection (a) of § 1621 states:
(a) With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the
period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power,
the President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such
proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and pub-
lished in the Federal Register.
Id.
87. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (1976). Subsection (d) of sec. 1622 states:
(d) Automatic termination of national emergency; continuation notice
from President to Congress; publication in Federal Register
Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance
with this subchapter, and not otherwise previously terminated, shall ter-
minate on the anniversary of the declaration of that emergency if, within
the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President does
not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice
stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such
anniversary.
Id.
88. See Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to Cuba, 62 Fed.
Reg. 9,347 (Feb. 27, 1997); Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to
Cuba, 63 Fed. Reg. 9,923 (Feb. 25, 1998); Continuation of the National Emergency
Relating to Cuba, 64 Fed. Reg. 9,903 (Feb. 24, 1999); Continuation of the National
Emergency Relating to Cuba, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,929 (Feb. 25, 2000).
89. See Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to Cuba, 66 Fed.
Reg. 12,841 (Feb. 27, 2001); Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to
Cuba, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,387 (Feb. 26, 2002); Continuation of the National Emergency
Relating to Cuba, 68 Fed. Reg. 9,849 (Feb. 27, 2003); Continuation of the National
Emergency Relating to Cuba, 69 Fed. Reg. 9,513 (Feb. 26, 2004); Continuation of
the National Emergency Relating to Cuba, 70 Fed. Reg. 8,919 (Feb. 18, 2005);
Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to Cuba, 71 Fed. Reg. 2,133
(Jan. 10, 2006); Continuation of the National Emergency Relating to Cuba, 72 Fed.
Reg. 9,231 (Feb. 26, 2007).
90. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1046 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "national
emergency").
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revisit the basis for the American Cuban embargo each year."9 '
LIBERTAD essentially "codified the regulations implementing the
Cuban embargo." 92 Nevertheless, U.S. Presidents annually renew
the national emergency status as to Cuba under the authority con-
ferred by the IEEPA.93 The combination of presidential national
emergency authority under the NEA and IEEPA results essentially
in dual-coverage of emergency status for Cuban relations. 94
6. The Bush Administration and U.S.-Cuba Policy
The administration of George W. Bush, most notably the sec-
ond administration, has vigorously pursued enforcement of sanc-
tions on Cuba.95 In addition to the administration's initial denial
of the MLB's license request for Cuban participation in the WBC,
the Bush administration returned fifteen Cubans to Cuba upon a
strict "interpretation of current 'wet foot/dry foot' standards, 96
(which was later ruled by a federal judge to be wrongful);97 denied
visas to fifty-four of the fifty-eight "Cuban scholars scheduled to par-
ticipate in the Twenty-sixth International Congress of the Latin
American Studies Association;" 98 and, prompted the expulsion of
"a group of [sixteen] Cuban businessmen who were meeting with
U.S. oil company representatives [in a Mexican hotel] to discuss
possibilities for offshore drilling."99 Most recently, Oscar-winning
film director and outspoken critic of President Bush, Michael
Moore came under investigation by OFAC in relation to his film
Sicko, in which he takes U.S. citizens suffering from 9/11-related
illnesses to Cuba for treatment.'0 0
91. United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 127 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (reviewing
history of U.S. foreign policy regarding Cuba).
92. Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 203 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (re-
viewing legislative background of Cuban embargo for determination of intellectual
property rights).
93. For a discussion of the annual renewal of IEEPA presidential authority as
to Cuba, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the annual renewal of national emergency presidential
authority as to Cuba under the NEA, see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
95. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 4 (reviewing Bush administration's "zealous
pursuit of potential violations" of Cuban embargo, most notably in early 2006).
96. See id. at 3-4.
97. See Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1348
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that Cuban migrants who landed on bridge had "dry
feet" for purpose of seeking political asylum).
98. Lutjens, supra note 15, at 4.
99. Id.
100. See Michael Moore on the Hot Seat for Film's Cuba Trip, CNN.com, http://
www.cnn.com/2007/SHOWBIZ/TV/05/10/film.michaelmoore.ap/index.html
(on file with author) ("The Treasury Department's [OFAC] notified Moore in a
[ ol. 15: p. 135
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As early as 2001, President Bush called for an increase in OFAC
power to restrict licensing.' 0 1 Then, in May 2002, President Bush
announced his Initiative for a New Cuba ("INC"), explaining that
the United States would promote humanitarian aid to Cuba, while
upholding economic restrictions on the island nation until it
demonstrated "free and fair" elections and began "to adopt mean-
ingful market-based reforms." 10 2 Interestingly, Bush's remarks,
from the East Room of the White House, were demonstrably po-
larized, resembling "trash talk" between competing athletes. Bush
described Castro as a "tyrant" with "bankrupt vision" who is sur-
rounded by "his cronies."' 0 3 Furthermore, the "you first" basis that
underlies President Bush's INC presumes a power structure be-
tween the nations: "If Cuba's Government... and if Cuba also...
only then I will work .... 104
B. Modern Politics, International Sports and the U.S.
Although the modern Olympic Games were envisioned as the
"'free trade of the future,' [where] [n]o nation would regulate
[for]... its political advantage," the Olympic Games and other in-
ternational athletic competitions have become routine grounds for
political standoff. 0 5 In an era of global conflict and global sport,
the two arenas inevitably overlap. 10 6 Since the "first postwar Games
were held in London" in 1948, political strategizing resulted in the
ban or refused participation of dozens of nations in international
competitions. 10 7 Germany and Japan's Axis alliance in World War
letter dated May 2[,2007] that it was conducting a civil investigation for possible
violations of the U.S. trade embargo restricting travel to Cuba.").
101. See Statement: Toward a Democratic Cuba, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1036 (July 13, 2001) [hereinafter Statement] ("I have asked the Treasury Depart-
ment to enhance and expand the enforcement capabilities of the [OFAC] .... It
is important that we uphold and enforce the law to the fullest extent with a view
toward preventing unlicensed and excessive travel ....").
102. Remarks Announcing the Initiative for a New Cuba, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 853 (May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Remarks Announcing] (reviewing nec-
essary changes on part of Cuba prior to U.S. lessening economic sanctions).
103. Id. at 852-53.
104. Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
105. NAFZIGER, supra note 19, at 49 (quoting Baron Pierre de Coubertin,
founder of modern Olympics). Nafziger notes, however, that "considering the
course of twentieth century history," politics and sports have remained distinct
"[t]o a remarkable extent." Id.
106. See id. ("Simply stated, the international sports arena is also a political
arena."). "Sports and the arts are too often forced to carry the burden of failed
diplomacy." Vecsey, supra note 10, at 811.
107. See NAFZINGER, supra note 19, at 50 (reviewing examples of nation exclu-
sion from international competitions).
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II resulted in their ban from the 1948 Olympics. 1° 8 Additionally,
conflict with Palestine also banned Israel from the 1948 Olym-
pics.' 0 9 East Germany declined participation in the 1952 Olympics
due to a statehood recognition conflict with the International
Olympic Committee. 110 "Several national teams boycotted the 1956
Games in Melbourne to protest the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the
British-French seizure of the Suez Canal, and... the participation
by a Taiwanese team ... ."III The 1968 Olympic Games are noted
for the demonstration of "Black Power" by "two American sprint-
ers."1 12 Politics continued to play an important role in the 1972
Olympic Games in Munich after Israeli athletes died in a terrorist
attack. 113 Finally, in 1980, U.S. President Carter organized a boy-
cott of the Moscow Olympic Games.
114
The United States gradually began to use sports as a political
tool in the 1970s."15 Despite the extensive regulatory clamp on
U.S.-Cuba relations, the Unites States permitted Cuban participa-
tion in several U.S.-hosted international sporting events. 1' 6 In
1987, the U.S. allowed Cuban athletes to participate in the Pan-
American Games in Indianapolis, Indiana.' 1 7 Cuba also competed
in the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, without
political conflict."18 The Clinton administration permitted the Cu-
ban national baseball team to play an exhibition game against the
108. See id. (describing post-WWII international relations and athletic
competitions).
109. See id. (describing political conflicts at 1948 Olympics).
110. See id. (explaining East Germany's political protestation of Olympics as
means of prompting international recognition).
111. Id.
112. See NAFZINGER, supra note 19, at 50.
113. See id. (detailing tragedy at Munich Olympics).
114. See id. (describing politics' role in 1980 Games).
115. See id. at 53 (noting reversal of relative U.S. modesty in sport-politics
upon realization "that governmental involvement in sports may help promote the
national interest . . ."). "The more immediate motivations for a foreign sports
policy included public disenchantment with the management and quality of partic-
ipation by the United States team in the 1972 (Munich) Olympic Games and the
public's shock of witnessing terrorism there." Id.
116. See The Associated Press, U.S. Government Shuts Cuba Out of World Baseball
Classic, PrTr. TRIB. REV., Dec. 16, 2005, at Sports (reviewing Cuban participation in
international sporting events hosted by United States).
117. See NAFZIGER, supra note 19, at 92-93 (1988) ("In 1987 the United Sates
issued visas to a large delegation of athletes from Cuba, with which the United
States did not maintain diplomatic relations, to enable them to participate in the
Pan-American Games in Indianapolis.").
118. See Stephen Wilson, Rogge Wants No Trouble over Cuba if US. Bids for 2016,
HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Jan. 19, 2006, at 13 (noting International Olympic Commit-
tee President Jacques Rogge's comments regarding lack of entry restrictions upon
Cuban teams at 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta); see also The Associated Press,
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Baltimore Orioles at Camden Yards in 1999.119 In the summer of
2005, "Cuba's national soccer team was allowed to come to the
United States for the [Confederation of North, Central American
and Caribbean Association Football] Gold Cup, the championship
of North and Central America and the Caribbean." 120
International sports, though ideally not associated with politics,
have developed a consistent pattern of diplomatic entanglements
and protestations. Cuba, though economically and ideologically
separated from the United States, was allowed to compete in U.S.-
hosted sporting events, with increasing frequency, prior to the
WBC.
C. Special License for Cuban Participation in Athletic
Competitions With the Potential of Earnings
Currently, U.S. policy requires a special license, via OFAC, for
Cuban participation in a U.S.-hosted sporting event, if the event
offers financial gain.121 OFAC is a division of the United States De-
partment of the Treasury ("Treasury"),122 and the Treasury is a
component of the executive branch. 123 Because the discretion is
vested in OFAC via the Treasury, and the Treasury's power is, in
turn, vested via the current U.S. presidential administration,1 24 the
Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR") serves as the preliminary gov-
supra note 116, at Sports (reviewing history of Cuban participation in U.S.-held
events).
119. See The Associated Press, supra note 116, at Sports ("In 1999, the U.S.
government allowed Cuba's national team to play an exhibition game against the
Baltimore Orioles at Camden Yards, the second leg of a home-and-home series.").
In 1999, prior to the relocation and renaming of the Montreal Expos to the Wash-
ington, D.C. Nationals, Baltimore was the geographically closest venue to the U.S.
capital for such an exhibition against a Major League Baseball team.
120. Id.
121. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b) (2003) (governing specific licensing proce-
dures); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.501 (2003) (referring to 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 for
licensing procedures specific to Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR")).
122. See U.S. Treasury - Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.trea-
sury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ (last visited June 29, 2007) (stating that "the
[OFAC] of the US Department of the Treasury administers" U.S. economic
sanctions).
123. See 31 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b) (2003) (defining Treasury Department). Sub-
sections (a) and (b) of § 301 state:
(a) The Department of the Treasury is an executive department of the
United States Government at the seat of the Government.
(b) The head of the Department is the Secretary of the Treasury. The
Secretary is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.
Id.
124. For a discussion of the bestowing of authority upon the Secretary of the
Treasury and, in turn, upon OFAC, see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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erning doctrine for OFAC. 125 Chapter V, Part 500 of the CFR, enti-
tled "Foreign Assets Control Regulations," promulgates the
administrative laws enforced upon nations designated by the cur-
rent U.S. President. 126 More particularly, Section 500.101 of Title
31, Subsection b, stipulates that licensing transactions are only au-
thorized by means of the TWEA, the Foreign Assistance Act, "or any
proclamation, order, regulation or license issued pursuant
thereto." 127
OFAC permits two forms of licensing for transactions with
countries sanctioned by the TWEA: general and specific licenses. 128
Part 515 of Chapter V, entitled "Cuban Assets Control Regulations"
("CACR"), deals expressly with OFAC's power to enforce the U.S.
embargo on Cuba. 129 Subsection 201 prohibits the "withdrawal
from the United States of . . currency" to Cuba without the authori-
zation of the Secretary of the Treasury. 130 Although the CACR spe-
cifically addresses licensing for U.S. citizens and residents to travel
to Cuba for participation in athletic competitions,13 ' no corollary
regulation exists for Cuban residents traveling to the United States
for sporting events. 132
125. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 500 (2006) (introducing sanction regulations).
126. See id.
127. 31 C.F.R. § 500.101 (2006) (authorizing transactions via TWEA). Sec-
tion (b) states:
No license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to this
part shall be deemed to authorize any transaction prohibited by any law
other than the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b), as
amended, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2370, or any
proclamation, order, regulation or license issued pursuant thereto.
Id.
128. See 31 C.F.R. §501.801 (2001) (defining general and specific licenses).
General licenses are those "issued authorizing under appropriate terms and condi-
tions certain types of transactions which are subject to the prohibitions contained
in [Title 31, Chapter V of the C.F.R.]." Id. Specific licenses are those "not author-
ized by general license." Id.
129. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1997) (regarding CACR).
130. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a)(3) (1997) (prohibiting transfer of currency
from United States). 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (a) prohibits the transactions specifically
enumerated in Subsections (a) (1)-(3) to "a forcign country designated under this
part." 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a) (1997). 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (d) specifically lists Cuba
as a "foreign country designated under this part." 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(d) (1997).
131. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.567 (2001) (regulating licenses for U.S. residents trav-
eling to Cuba).
132. Licensing for the authorization of Cuban travel to the United States is
governed by 31 C.F.R. § 515.571 (2001), which regulates travel-related transactions
for Cuban nationals in the United States. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.567 (2001) (directing
the reader to "[s]ee § 515.571 for the authorization of certain transactions related
to the activities of nationals of Cuba traveling in the United States.").
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III. ANALYSIS
The Treasury Department's initial license denial to the Cuban
national baseball team, and later revocation of that denial, raised
both microcosmic and macrocosmic political-legal issues in regard
to U.S.-Cuba relations. Appropriately, the unique standoff sur-
rounding the WBC allows for a multi-faceted inquiry into the struc-
tural foundations of constitutional and administrative law that yield
the authority behind OFAC licensing decisions and the political
consequences of those decisions as they play out in international
relations. Additionally, a critical analysis of the discursive structures
displayed by both the United States and Cuba during the political
exchange resulting from the OFAC licensing denial highlights the
absurdity of the contemporary U.S.-Cuba rift.
A. Checks on Executive Authority; Appealability of
OFAC Decisions
Because the founders of American democracy had exper-
ienced oppressive tyranny resulting from an overseas monarchy,
they were not concerned with political efficiency as much as limit-
ing authority when establishing a new system of government. 133
Therefore, in order "to preserve the liberties of the people from
excessive concentrations of authority,"' 3 4 the founders structured
the U.S. Constitution to divide the federal government into a tripod
of branches, each with mutual checks and balances. 13 5 Likewise,
parallel systems of government between the several states and the
federal branches instilled additional checks and balances upon
power,13 6 thereby reinforcing "principles... of our dual and com-
bined polity [that] are indispensable to the harmonious and benefi-
cial working of the system."' 37 Removed from the tyranny of an
133. See Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ("Even the Government-the organ of the whole
people-is restricted by the system of checks and balances established by our Con-
stitution. The designers of that system distributed authority among the three
branches 'not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power."').
134. United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 (1947).
"Checks and balances were established in order that this should be 'a government
of laws and not of men."' Myers, 272 U.S. at 292.
135. SeeJason Luong, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1181, 1182 (2000) (reviewing Consti-
tutional format of U.S. democracy).
136. See Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U.S. 136, 138 (1870) (describing system of
checks and balances).
137. Id.
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overseas monarchy, the founders constructed American democracy
to limit government power by distributing it: "[b]y these mutual
checks and balances by and between the branches of government,
democracy undertakes to preserve the liberties of the people from
excessive concentrations of authority."1 38 For the founders, democ-
racy was not concerned with efficiency as much as limiting
authority. 139
Based on this separation of power, foreign policy decisions
have generally been reserved for the executive branch under the
political question doctrine, without subjection to judicial scru-
tiny.140 Although not all foreign policy decisions are outside the
realm of judicial review, 141 because the Supreme Court has recog-
nized congressional limitations in foreign policy and foreign af-
fairs,142 when the President does act within the scope of
138. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 91. "Checks and balances were established in order
that this should be 'a government of laws and not of men."' Myers, 272 U.S. at 292.
139. See Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)) (discussing rationale of checks and balances).
140. SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(defining political question doctrine).
The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those con-
troversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the
confines of the Executive Branch .... As Baker [369 U.S. 186 (1962)]
plainly held, however, the courts have the authority to construe treaties
and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting
congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal
courts.
Id.
141. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("It is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.").
142. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)) ("Whether or not the President has independent power, absent con-
gressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on
his powers."). In Hamdan, the Court failed to find the dissenting opinions ofJus-
tices Thomas, Scalia and Alito persuasive in dealing with the habeas relief claim of
a Guantanamo detainee. See id. at 2749 (stating holding). Justice Thomas argued
in dissent that in times of conflict between foreign nations, such as the war on
terrorism, "[the Court's] duty to defer to the Executive's military and foreign pol-
icy judgment is at its zenith." Id. at 2825 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas, with-
out persuading the Court, went on to state that military and foreign policy
judgments:
are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsi-
bility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
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congressionally 'Conferred authority, his actions are given wide
latitude. 143
In addition, the nondelegation doctrine, which stems from the
separation of powers and constitutional structure of checks and bal-
ances, "recognizes that the coordinate branches must be allowed a
certain degree of discretion in carrying out legislation" and, accord-
ingly, "requires that legislation provide intelligible principles to
guide the exercise of discretion.' 1 44 In turn, "intelligible princi-
plel[s]" allow a reviewing Court "to determine 'whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed' or whether a statute's 'absence of stan-
dards for. . . guidance' essentially grants de facto legislative author-
ity to a coordinate branch. '145
In the spectrum of foreign relations, the U.S. government is
largely unchecked and unbalanced, 146 with "the Court allow[ing]
Congress to defer greatly to the discretion of the president....
As a result, "the separation of powers doctrine in the foreign affairs
arena is left to the determination of Congress and the president."1 4
Furthermore, even though the IEEPA narrowed the scope of presi-
dential authority solely to times of war, it still lacked "intelligible
principles to guide the discretion of the president in choosing
which powers to use. "149
In particular, the grandfather clause of the IEEPA stands as the
marquis example of guidance of presidential power that lacks an
intelligible principle. 150 Indeed, even the Supreme Court struggled
to define the extent of presidential power conferred by the grandfa-
ther clause, coming only to a five-four decision in Regan.151 In addi-
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582-83
(2004)).
143. See id. at 2824 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981)) ("When 'the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization from Congress,' his actions are 'supported by the strongest
of presumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpretation, and the burden
of persuasion . . .restis] heavily upon any who might attack it."').
144. See Luong, supra note 135, at 1183-84 (describing nondelegation
doctrine).
145. Id. at 1184.
146. See id. at 1186-87 ("It is no longer accurate to characterize our govern-
ment, in matters of foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and
balanced against each other.").
147. Id. at 1187.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1190 (applying nondelegation doctrine to IEEPA).
150. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority's conferral of presidential power under IEEPA grandfa-
ther clause).
151. See id. (debating IEEPA guidance or lack thereof throughout).
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tion, presidential treatment of the IEEPA grandfather clause
corroborates its unintelligibility. For example, between the passage
of the IEEPA and the Supreme Court decision in Regan, each Presi-
dent renewed the U.S. national emergency status with respect to
Cuba, a practice which continued even after Regan.152
Moreover, the delegation of authority engenders an addition-
ally relevant legal issue in light of the federal government's inade-
quate performance in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, namely
the potential of nepotism in executive appointments. 153 Article II,
section 2 of the U.S. Constitution assigns the President the power to
"nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate,. .. appoint.., all other Officers of the United States."154 Under
the definition set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, the OFAC direc-
tor is one such officer of the United States. 155 "[A] vast array of
complementary or lesser war powers short of the use of military
force... are granted to the president, but [the] use [of those pow-
ers] is not as prominent and not as open to public scrutiny [as war
powers]."156
During the Cuban licensing denial, the position of OFAC di-
rector was held by Robert Werner, who replaced long-time director
Richard Newcomb in 2004.157 Werner held the position for only
152. For a discussion on the renewal of the national emergency with respect
to Cuba, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
153. See David Oshinsky, Hell and High Water, N.Y. TIMES, July, 9, 2006, at 71
(reviewing prevalent administrative cronyism made public in the wake of Hurri-
cane Katrina). "Michael Brown, director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, personified the cronyism that had corrupted FEMA in recent years. Fol-
lowing Brown's behavior during the crisis - his broken promises about sending
buses and supplies, his private concerns about looking stylish and eating well - is
an ordeal." Id.
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
155. SeeBuckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,126 (1976) ("We think its fair import is
that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be ap-
pointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article."). Moreover, the
President is further granted "a vast array of complementary or lesser war powers
short of the use of military force .... but [the] use [of those powers] is not as
prominent and not as open to public scrutiny [as war powers]." See Luong, supra
note 135, at 1181 (reviewing lesser known presidential authorities).
156. Luong, supra note 135 at 1181.
157. See Luxner News, Inc., Publishers, Authors Blast OFAC Regulations as 'Censor-
ship;' Bob Werner to head OFAC, CUBA NEws, Oct. 1, 2004, at 4 ("On Oct. 1 [, 2004],
Robert Werner replaced Richard Newcomb as director of Treasury's [OFAC].").
Werner, who was the Treasury's assistant general counsel for enforce-
ment and intelligence, previously served in the Justice Department's Of-
fice of Legal Counsel. He was also a federal prosecutor in Connecticut,
and once headed that state's gaming regulatory agency. In the private
sector, Werner was a partner at Bingham Dana LLP (now Bingham Mc-
Cutchen) and an officer at The Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance
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two years; 158 he "now serves as the Director of the Treasury's Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)." 159 Barbara Ham-
merle replaced Werner an interim basis. 160 Hammerle then ceded
authority to OFAC's current director, Adam Szubin, 161 who was
named to the position on August 1, 2006.162 As a result, over a 26-
month period, four unelected officials-Newcomb, Werner, Ham-
merle, and Szubin-were all delegated the authority to carry out
forty-year-old embargo laws against Cuba, blanketed in a national
foreign policy that features a President-renewed national
emergency. 163
Moreover, although the IEEPA powers of economic regulation
conferred upon the president are seemingly necessary for emergen-
cies, it is inherently problematic that the president also possesses
the authority to declare emergency status, thus triggering the eco-
nomic regulatory powers. 164 The IEEPA attempts to limit this au-
thority by requiring congressional consultation, if possible;
however, the Cuban regulations transcend the IEEPA through the
Company (now The Phoenix Companies). Newcomb, who in August an-
nounced his intent to leave OFAC after heading the agency for 17 years,
will work for the Washington law firm of Baker Donelson.
Id; see also Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, http://www.
bakerdon-elson.com/ContentWide.aspx?NodeD=32&Person ID=5958 (last visited
June 29, 2007) (listing countries Newcomb "was responsible for implementing eco-
nomic sanctions and asset controls against [such as] Burma, Cuba, Iran, Liberia,
Libya, Sudan, Zimbabwe .... Colombia, and . .. Syria [as well as] Serbia, Angola,
the Taliban, Haiti, South Africa, Panama, Vietnam, North Korea and Cambodia").
158. See Luxner News, Inc., supra note 157 (detailing Werner's career).
159. U.S. Treasury Press Releases, Adam Szubin Named New OFAC Director,
http://www.ustreas.gov.press/release.hp39.htm (last visited June 29, 2007).
160. See id. (noting Hammerle "served as Acting OFAC Director since Wer-
ner's departure").
161. Acccording to his biography on the U.S. Treasury website:
Szubin came to the Treasury from the Department of Justice, where he
served as Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, coordinating the De-
partment's efforts to combat terrorism financing. Prior to assuming that
position, he worked as a trial attorney in the Civil Division of the Justice
Department, serving as a member of the Terrorism Litigation Task Force.
Szubin clerked forJudge Ronald Gilman on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. He graduated from Harvard Law School, cum laude,
and Harvard College, magna cum laude, and was a Fulbright scholar.
U.S. Treasury - Biography of Adam J. Szubin - Director of OFAC, http://www.
treasury.gov/organization/bios/szubin-e.html (last visited June 29, 2007).
162. See id.
163. For a discussion on the historical background of the CACR, see supra
notes 48-51 and accompanying text; for a discussion on the annual renewal of
national emergency status under IEEPA presidential powers with respect to Cuba,
see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
164. See Luong, supra note 135, at 1212 (illustrating inherent conflict involved
in IEEPA presidential authority).
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grandfather clause, thus making such a requirement unclear. Fur-
thermore, any consultation requirement becomes moot if Congress
yields itself as an executive rubber stamp, since "emergency powers
are consistent with free government only when their control is
lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them."'165
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court
warned of such unbounded presidential authority, stating, "[b]y his
prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion
[the President] exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to
check and balance his power which often cancels their effective-
ness."' 66 Although Youngstown technically dealt with the domestic
use of executive powers, foreign policy implicated by the Korean
War, Cold War, and Red Scare defined the contemporary political
climate. 167 As such, significant parallels exist between Youngstown
and the Cuba licensing situation in that both featured delegated
executive authority, carried out domestically, in a martial political
context in the absence of congressionally declared war.
What democratic channels were present for World Baseball
Classic, Inc. after OFAC's initial denial of a special license for the
Cuban national team? Assuming, arguendo, that OFAC's initial de-
nial was not self-reversed, the question arises of the Cuban national
team's available remedies. OFAC's initial denial of MLB's licensing
application for Cuban participation in the WBC did not preclude
MLB from submitting an additional application for a specific li-
cense. 168 In fact, MLB took advantage of this opportunity and ap-
plied for specific licensing of Cuban participation, leading to
OFAC's reversal. 169
Agency decisions, such as OFAC's denial of Cuban participa-
tion in the WBC, generally remain undisturbed if they are reasona-
165. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).
167. See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The
Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 151-53 (1993) (citing Alan F.
Westin, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958)).
168. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b) (4) (2001) ("The denial of a license does not
preclude the reopening of an application or the filing of a further application.
The applicant or any other party in interest may at any time request explanation of
the reasons for a denial by correspondence or personal interview.").
169. See The Associated Press, Cuba Will Be Included in Classic U.S. Treasury Says
Play Ball, AUGUSTA CHRON.,Jan. 21, 2006, at C07 ("Baseball's first application was
denied in mid-December by the Treasury Department's [OFAC], but the commis-
sioner's office and the players' association reapplied after Cuba said it would do-
nate any profits it receives to victims of Hurricane Katrina.").
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ble. 170 "An agency decision is reasonable 'so long as it is not
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law." '" 171 In Consarc Corp.
v. U.S. Treasury Dep't, Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dealt with an interpre-
tation of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations and found equity argu-
ments unpersuasive considering the broad deference given to
OFAC in interpreting its own statutes. 172 By the standard estab-
lished in Consarc, a challenge to OFAC's interpretation of the gov-
erning statute "must either demonstrate that the statute clearly
forbids [OFAC's] interpretation or that the interpretation is unrea-
sonable."1 7 3 As the administrative agency authorized to grant li-
censes for Cuban travel, OFAC decisions are subject to such review.
The Supreme Court set out a new standard for judicial review
of a statute in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
sel, Inc.174 Chevron dealt with the Court's review of an Environmen-
tal Protection Agency interpretation of a congressional act.175 The
Chevron Court held:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the stat-
ute which it administers, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the in-
tent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply im-
pose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.176
170. See Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (stating procedure for agency review).
171. Id. (quoting Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1319 (l1th Cir. 1991)) (re-
viewing "varying levels of deference due to agency decisions" set out by Supreme
Court).
172. See 71 F.3d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (interpreting Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations).
173. Id. at 914.
174. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
175. See id. at 837 (stating facts of case).
176. Id. at 842-43.
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The Chevron Court went on to state that "[w] e have long recog-
nized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative inter-
pretations 'has been consistently followed by the Court .... -17 7
OFAC's interpretation of its own regulations "receives 'an even
greater degree of deference than the Chevron standard, and must
prevail unless plainly inconsistent with the regulation. "'17 8 Interest-
ingly, however, OFAC does not discuss individual license applica-
tions or denials with the media. 179 In fact, Molly Millerwise, a
spokeswoman for the Treasury Department, said "that it was against
policy to comment on individual applications."18 0 Seemingly in
contrast with OFAC policy, the Freedom of Information Act re-
quires that agencies publish final opinions and decisions.1 81 None-
theless, grounds for OFAC's denial of Cuban licensing for the WBC
were never publicly released.
OFAC decisions are not immune to review.' 82 For appeal pur-
poses, an OFAC decision on a license "constitute[s] final agency
177. Id. at 844.
178. Consarc, 71 F.3d at 915 (quoting Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d
695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating OFAC interpretation of Iraqi Sanctions Regula-
tions accords greater judicial deference because such regulations are OFAC
regulations).
179. SeeJack Curry, Baseball; New effort by MLB to include Cuba in World Classic,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at D3 (reviewing MLB's revised application for OFAC
special license permitting Cuban participation).
180. Id. (quoting email of Millerwise).
181. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(a) (2003). Section 501.805(a) of Title 31
declares:
The records of the Office of Foreign Assets Control which are required by
the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) to be made available to
the public shall be made available in accordance with the definitions, pro-
cedures, payment of fees, and other provisions of the regulations on the
Disclosure of Records of the Departmental Offices and of other bureaus
and offices of the Department of the Treasury issued under 5 U.S.C. 552
and published at 31 CFR part 1.
Id. Furthermore, the Freedom of Information Act states that:
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well
as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register...
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (A)-(B) (2002).
182. See Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (reviewing Coast Guard decision). Because the Coast Guard is an
agency, similar to OFAC, if its Coast Guard decisions are reviewable, it follows that
OFAC's decisions are also reviewable.
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action."' 13 Although the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
governs judicial review of government agency decisions, 8 4 because
OFAC rules deal with foreign policy issues, they are generally not
subject to the APA.'8 5 Despite the inapplicability of the APA, Fed-
eral Courts have held OFAC decisions, regarding the IEEPA, to
APA standards forjudicial review. 186 Thus, OFAC decisions that are
183. 31 C.F.R. § 501.802 (2003) ("[OFAC] will advise each applicant of the
decision respecting filed applications. The decision of the [OFAC] acting on be-
half of the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to an application shall constitute
final agency action.").
184. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966) (delineating scope ofjudicial review of govern-
ment agency decisions). 5 U.S.C. § 706 states:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory ight;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error.
Id.
185. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.804 (2003). The Code of Federal Regulations deals
with the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to OFAC rulemaking:
(a) All rules and other public documents are issued by the Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control. In general, rulemaking by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control involves foreign affairs functions of the United
States, and for that reason is exempt from the requirements under the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) for notice of proposed
rulemaking, opportunity for public comment, and delay in effective date.
(b) Any interested person may petition the Director of the Office of For-
eign Assets Control in writing for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of
any rule.
Id.
186. See Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 706 standard of review to OFAC determina-
tion that charitable foundation was "Specifically Designated Global Terrorist"); see
also Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 846, 851 n.2 (E.D. La. 1992)
(noting IEEPA and APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, allow for judicial review of OFAC deci-
sions). The Court in Holy Land went on to state "if the OFAC's actions were not
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based on substantial evidence and are not arbitrary or capricious
must be affirmed by the reviewing court. 187
This history of OFAC review engenders the question of the re-
viewability of the WBC licensing denial. One U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals determined the congressional intent behind the Cuban
embargo was "to prevent any Cuban national or entity from at-
tracting hard currency into Cuba by selling, assigning, or otherwise
transferring rights subject to United States jurisdiction."'88 Arguably,
under this definition, the granting of prize money from an interna-
tional competition does not fall under the embargo's intended
scope. 189 Only to the extent that the embargo seeks to limit trans-
actional economic activity and not currency conferred by means of
reward, could a liberal OFAC execution of the embargo have been
construed.
OFAC's initial denial of MLB's licensing application for Cuban
participation in the WBC can be viewed as arbitrary because the
determination was made by an individual rather than by rules and
procedures. Moreover, the decision was arguably founded in
prejudice rather than in fact.190 The existence of alternative politi-
cal-economic motivations for the reversal of the licensing denial
suggests the initial denial was arbitrary. 191
The puzzles of U.S. policy toward Cuba in 2006 are strik-
ing .... Responding to pressure from the Puerto Rican
government, the International Baseball Federation, and
the International Olympic Committee (which warned that
violation of Olympic standards of inclusion of all athletes
might jeopardize future U.S. bids to host the games),
OFAC reconsidered and granted Cuba the license .... 192
arbitrary and capricious, and were based on substantial evidence, we must affirm."
333 F.3d at 162.
187. See Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 162. In Holy Land, the Court upheld the Trea-
sury's authority to define property interests under the IEEPA as broadly as "an
interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." Id. (quoting 31 C.F.R.
§ 500.311-.312 (1990)).
188. Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir.
2000) (emphasis added) (declaring congressional intent behind embargo and stat-
ing "[t]he CACR make this clear, and the LIBERTAD Act, by codifying the CACR,
provides unmistakable evidence of congressional purpose." (emphasis added)).
189. See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201-.204 (1967) (detailing economic sanc-
tion regulation).
190. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 110 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "arbitrary" as
"founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact.").
191. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 3-4 (reviewing suspicious grounds for denial
and reversal of decision).
192. Id. at 3.
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Venezuela also offered to host the WBC after the U.S. denied
Cuba the necessary licensing.1 93 "The International Baseball Feder-
ation... notified Major League Baseball that it [would] withdraw its
sanction of the Classic without the presence of. . . defending
Olympic champion [Cuba], and rightfully so."194 Additionally,
"Florida is a swing state in presidential elections," lending the sig-
nificant population of vociferous, anti-Castro Cuban-Americans
within its borders considerable political clout.1 95 Almost humor-
ously, the U.S. government pays hard currency to Cuba in the form
of an annual $4,000 rent check for the U.S. military facility at Guan-
tanamo Bay. 196 The lease agreement for Guantanamo stems from
1903, when Theodore Roosevelt "leased it from the newly formed
Republic of Cuba as a naval base and coaling station."'1 7 Further-
ing the political posturing, Fidel Castro refuses to cash the U.S.
checks. 198 All these factors lend support to the argument that the
agency decision was arbitrary.
B. Regan v. Wald Revisited
The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Regan v.
Wald serves as the seminal interpretation of the IEEPA grandfather
clause. 199 The 1977 Treasury Department regulations adjusted the
TWEA so as to limit presidential authority to times of war, and elim-
inating presidential authority in times of national emergency. 200 In
Regan, the Court read the IEEPA's grandfather clause as allowing
the President to continue exercising national emergency power "in
order to continue existing economic embargoes, such as that
against Cuba," without having to "declare a new national emer-
gency. ' 201 Because "the 'authority' to regulate all property transac-
193. See The Associated Press, Venezuela Proposes Hosting Part of World Baseball
Classic, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
baseball/2005-12-28-venezuelax.htm.
194. Vecsey, supra note 10, at 811.
195. See Laughter in Havana Decades-old U.S. Embargo Hurts Everyone but Fidel
Castro, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 9, 2006, at B8 (noting political value of Florida).
196. See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT 19-20 (2005) (describing
ongoing U.S. lease of land for Guantanamo Bay from Cuba).
197. Id. at 19.
198. See id. at 19-20 ("[A] disgusted Fidel Castro ... refused to cash it.").
199. See 468 U.S. 222, 222 (1984) (addressing 1982 amendment to 1977 Trea-
sury Department regulations dealing with Cuban property transactions).
200. See id. at 227-28 (discussing curtailment of TWEA).
201. Id. at 228. The 1982 amendment in question in Regan curtailed travel to
Cuba. See id. at 222. As a result, a group of U.S. citizens seeking to travel to Cuba
brought an action against the government. See id. (discussing procedural history of
case).
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tions with Cuba. . .was being 'exercised' on July 1, 1977," the
grandfather clause of the IEEPA preserved the President's ability to
exercise national emergency authority without declaring annual na-
tional emergencies.20 2 In a five-four opinion, the majority upheld
the 1982 amendments, which restricted travel to Cuba.20 3 Seem-
ingly failing to separate "heightened tensions" from "war," the
Court stated: "Eliminating the President's authority to modify ex-
isting licenses in response to heightened tensions with Cuba would
have sparked just the sort of controversy the grandfather clause was
designed to avoid." 20 4
Three justices joined Justice Blackmun's dissent,20 5 finding the
grandfather clause did not "encompass[ I] the exercise of Presiden-
tial power" required to enforce the 1.982 restrictions on travel-re-
lated transactions. 20 6 By granting the President broad authority
through the TWEA to determine when a national emergency began
and ended, the clause "operated as a one-way ratchet to enhance
greatly the President's discretionary authority over foreign pol-
icy."20 7 Likewise, contemporary members of the House Subcommit-
tee "believed that some of the actions taken by the Executive
Branch under the TWEA had, at most, a shaky foundation in actual
emergency situations." 20 8
The political background during the IEEPA's passage reflected
a congressional intent to limit executive power,20 9 as "a series of
events, including the Watergate scandal and... the Vietnam War,
prompted Congress to pass legislation constraining the President's
foreign policy authority."210 As a result, "to curtail the discretionary
authority over foreign affairs that the President had accumulated
because of past 'emergencies' that no longer fit Congress' concep-
202. See id. at 232 (detailing mechanics of IEEPA grandfather clause).
203. See id. at 244 ("[B]ased on an analysis of the language of the grandfather
clause as well as its purpose and legislative history, that the grandfathered authori-
ties of § 5(b) of TWFA provide an adequate statutory basis for . . . restricting the
scope of permissible travel-related transactions with Cuba and Cuban nationals.").
204. Regan, 468 U.S. at 223.
205. See id. at 244 (joining justice Blackmun's dissent were Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Powell).
206, See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I would affirm the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.").
207. Id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At the time the TWEA was
amended in 1977, the United States remained under four President-determined
states of national emergency: one by Franklin Roosevelt, one by Harry Truman,
and two by Richard Nixon. See id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 247 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
209. See Luong, supra note 135, at 1188 (reviewing historically contemporary
political climate influencing passage of IEEPA).
210. Id.
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tion of that term.... Congress amended the TWEA and enacted
the IEEPA."2 11
The IEEPA, without the grandfather clause, removed the Presi-
dent's national emergency authority under TWEA and replaced it
with authority for "unusual and extraordinary threat... if the Presi-
dent declares a national emergency."2 1 2 Under the IEEPA, the
President's use of national emergency power was limited to "con-
gressional consultation, review and termination."2 1 3 The grandfa-
ther clause, however, still dealt with regulations enacted under
TWEA prior to the passage of the IEEPA,2 1 4 such as the Cuban As-
sets Control Regulations.2 1 5
In debating whether to let existing regulations expire under
the IEEPA or to institute the grandfather clause, members of Con-
gress argued "[i] t would have been incongruous... for Congress to
force the President to declare new emergencies in nonemergency
situations simply to avoid having to end restrictions that, for negoti-
ating reasons, the President had concluded should not be ended
unilaterally. '" 2 16 In addition, "many of the grandfathered restric-
tions had no real basis in an emergency situation."2 17 By requiring
the President to annually renew declarations of a national emer-
gency, IEEPA "avoided perpetuating the 'phony character' of the
national emergencies under which . . .exercises of [TWEA] sec.
5(b) power were promulgated."2 18
To summarize, the IEEPA sought to limit presidential power in
times of national emergency.2 1 9 " [T] he primary purpose of the Act
was to curtail 'future uses' of precisely that residual [TWEA] au-
thority."22 0 Regardless of the outcome of the grandfather clause of
the IEEPA, the legislative motivation behind the IEEPA itself was to
211. Regan, 468 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 228 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §1701 (a)).
213. Id. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (explaining purpose of grandfather clause). The "(IEEPA) was
enacted to cover the President's exercise of emergency economic powers in re-
sponse to peacetime crises, . . .essentially the same authorities ... as those in
§ 5(b) of TWEA." Id. at 222.
215. For a discussion on the CACR, see supra notes 48-55 and accompanying
text.
216. Regan, 468 U.S. at 250 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 254 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
218. Id. (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
219. See id. at 259 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) "Congress had no hesitation
about restricting the President's authority to exercise the emergency powers that
he possessed but had not yet exercised." Id.
220. Id. (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
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limit presidential power.221 The majority opinion in Regan, uphold-
ing a wide interpretation of the IEEPA grandfather clause powers,
struck down a restrictive view of presidential powers. 222
Following a period of administrative deference to Congress
carrying out the Cuban embargo regulations, 223 the current admin-
istration has been typified by congressional deference to executive
power.224 Ironically, the bilateral approach to U.S. Cuba policy
under the previous administration lulled the legislative drive of the
previous political era, symbolized by the passage of the IEEPA.225
Consequently, the executive authority that awaited its fate before
the 1984 Supreme Court in Regan v. Wald has been reinvigorated,
exemplified by the board's expansive enforcement of minute for-
eign policy regulations. 226 Now, twenty years after the Regan v.
Wald decision, the issue of the President's authority in enforcing
the Cuban embargo arose once again in response to OFAC's denial
of a license that would have permitted the Cuban national team to
participate in the WBC. 227
C. Reading the Bush and Castro Dialogue Ideologically
The U.S.-Cuba, Bush-Castro conflict that arose during prepara-
tion for the WBC contains a strong ideological undercurrent. 228
The dialogue underlying President Bush's 2002 Initiative for a New
Cuba - "a beautiful island [turned] into a prison" - seemingly in-
culcates OFAC's 2006 actions denying Cuba a participatory license
221. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 246 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing pas-
sage of National Emergencies Act one year prior to IEEPA, which terminated Presi-
dent-declared national emergencies after two years).
222. See id. at 255 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court rejects this narrow
interpretation in favor of one that loses all sight of the general legislative purpose
of the IEEPA and the clear legislative intent behind the grandfather clause.").
223. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7 (noting congressional inclusion in Cuban
embargo enforcement under Clinton administration).
224. See id. (stating Congress has exhibited substantial deference to presiden-
tial power under Bush Administration).
225. See Luong supra note 135, at 1188-92 (discussing political context sur-
rounding IEEPA and Congress' subsequent desire to limit presidential authority).
226. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7 (listing slew of recent enforcement of
Cuban policy concerns by OFAC and executive branch); see also MARK P. SULLIVAN,
CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 109TH CONGRESS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at 1-6 (2006)
(reviewing recent developments in U.S.-Cuba policy).
227. For a discussion on the licensing of the Cuban national team and
OFAC's original denial, see supra notes 121-32.
228. See HOBERMAN, supra note 5, at 3 (describing ideology as "[a]ny system-
atic set of attitudes and beliefs, whether about ... political policy [and] appeal[s]
to economic factors, reason or emotion . . . ." (quoting L.B. Brown, Ideology, 10)).
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for the WBC. 22 9 Ironically, by refusing Cuban athletes' travel into
the United States, OFAC only reinforced the "prison"-like nature of
Cuba. Unlike the Clinton administration, which sought to bring
democratic change to Cuba through "people-to-people exchange,"
the hard-line stance of the George W. Bush administration has fur-
thered the "Cuba as prison" mentality.230 In fact, even the George
H.W. Bush administration allowed the U.S. to participate in the
1991 Havana-held Pan American Games.2 3'
President Castro's challenge of the OFAC license denial paral-
lels and foreshadows the physical challenge of baseball. 232 The uni-
queness of athletic competition - uniting the "[s] peed, force [and]
dexterity" of the human specimen with social display and theatrical-
ity - creates a unique "drama for which an ideology of dynamism in
the service of human self-expression becomes the ultimate
value." 23 3 Castro's emphasis on the Cuban national team as a
mechanized unit - "Cuba" - coincides with the Marxist background
of the nation.2 34 Although Marxist doctrine disavows "political ath-
leticism" because of its inherent narcissism and emphasis on "in-
trinsic human qualities, ' 235 Castro's adversarial responses to
OFAC's license denial simultaneously denote Cuba as a team, a
State, and an oppositional force to American bureaucracy and rein-
forced that "Castro is a rare phenomenon who presents the most
charismatic image of the statesman-athlete since Mussolini: his
physical charisma and passionate interest in sport are legendary."23 6
Particularly, Cuban national sport represents its national politi-
cal ideology.23 7 Cuba illustrates " [t] he social equation which brings
the closest interrelationship between culture, sport and politics
229. See Remarks Announcing, supra note 102, at 852 (depicting Castro's
rule).
230. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7 (delineating differences between U.S.-
Cuba policy under current and previous administrations).
231. See PaulaJ. Pettavino & Geralyn Pye, Sport in Cuba: Castro's Last Stand, in
SPORT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 148 (Joseph L. Arbena & David G.
LaFrance eds., 2002) (noting United States' second place finish to host nation
Cuba at 1991 Pan American Games).
232. See Curry, supra note 179, at D3 (stating that Cubans "view themselves,
rightfully so, as world champions and the Olympic champions...." (quoting Paul
Archey, MLB's senior vice president for international matters)).
233. See HOBERMAN, supra note 5, at 7-8 (exploring distinctive aspects of
athletics).
234. See id. at 71 (explaining Marxism's influence on Castro's view of Cuba's
national team).
235. See id. (discussing foundational tenets of Marxism as applied to sport).
236. Id. at 70.
237. See BENJAMIN LOWE, DAVID B. KANIN & ANDREW STRENK, SPORT AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS V (1978) (discussing importance of sports in Cuban culture).
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• . .[, beginning] [i]n 1967, [with] the Cuban government an-
nounc[ing] that sport was to be seen as an inseparable element of
education, culture, health, defence [sic], happiness and the devel-
opment of the people."23 8 Similarly, "[a]t the 1962 Caribbean
Games in Jamaica,... Castro sent his Cuban team on their way with
the message that their mission was to win and thereby demonstrate
that socialism was superior to capitalism."239
Upon Cuba's return from a second-place finish at the WBC,
the nation met the team with a parade to celebrate its - and the
country's - victory over the U.S.'s attempt to exclude them.240 "The
team of amateurs who returned to the island having outlasted every-
one butJapan received a hero's welcome at home. Many thousands
of Cubans lined the streets to cheer them on. Castro personally
greeted each player. .". ."241 As a result, "the image of the [athlete]
has led a double life: first, as a metaphor of the political leader and,
second, as a metaphor of the body politic." 242
Through sport, Cuba presents a singularity of nationhood to
the international community. 243 "Since taking power in 1959, the
Castro regime has been driven to restructure the island's sports cul-
ture by several motives: ideological principles, creation of the 'new
man,' military preparedness, gender and racial equity, public
health improvement, recreation and entertainment, domestic pride
in the nation, and international prestige." 244 At the 1996 Summer
Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, Cuba won nine gold medals and
twenty-five medals overall. 245 At the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Aus-
tralia, Cuba won eleven gold medals and twenty-nine medals over-
all.24 6 For Cuba, international sports competitions symbolize an
"embattled and isolated" national political struggle.2 47
238. Id.
239. Id. at 203. Unexpectedly, several of the national athletes defected while
in Jamaica. See id. (noting defection of several athletes after tournament).
240. See Latin American Institute, Cuba Thwarts U.S. Policy to Play in World Base-
ball Classic, but is Barred from Donating Winnings to Katrina Victims, Noticen: Cent.
Am. & Caribbean Aff., Mar. 30, 2006 (noting ties between performance at interna-
tional athletic competitions and nationalism).
241. Id.
242. HOBERMAN, supra note 5, at 54 (developing theory that athletics symbol-
izes political economy of state).
243. See Pettavino & Pye, supra note 231, at 145 (describing various motiva-
tions behind Cuba's cultural exuberance of sport).
244. Id.
245. See id. (reviewing past success at international competitions).
246. See id. (noting Cuban success at 2000 Olympics).
247. See id. at 158 (portraying future of Cuban sports).
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In contrast to the uniform, communist voice of Cuba, the
United States' political discourse throughout the licensing incident
has been markedly multi-faceted, symbolic of a democratic bureau-
cracy.24 Paralleling Cuba, the U.S. WBC team faced problems rep-
resentative of its own political system and cultural composition:
major league all-stars with dual-citizenship and varying heritage
faced the dilemma of choosing what team to play for while other
players worried about contract clauses and their own professional
careers.
249
On the face of the discourse between the U.S. and Cuba dur-
ing the licensing debacle, and, more latent, within the respective
sport cultures of each nation, clear differences exist. The repetitive
dialogue of bipolarization - "democracy" against "communist re-
gime" - trickled down through the administration into OFAC's
original license denial.250 By ultimately granting the Cuban na-
tional team a special license to participate in the WBC, however,
OFAC facilitated cultural interaction. 251 During the WBC, the Cu-
ban team stayed at a five-star hotel and took a charter bus to prac-
tices, which were held in a stadium more luxurious than Cuba's.252
The team took time to visit Habitat for Humanity, and, according to
a team translator: "They are absorbing everything. They are so
248. See The Associated Press, U.S. Government Shuts Cuba out of World Baseball
Classic, Prrr. TRIB. REv., Dec. 16, 2005, at Sports (quoting White House spokesman
Scott McClellan: "We want people in Cuba to participate in freedom."); Curry,
supra note 179 (reviewing statements by Treasury spokeswoman Molly Millerwise).
249. See generally Tyler Kepner, Baseball: Yankees'Notebook; The World Classic: No;
The World Series: Yes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at D8 (depicting various perceptions
of MLB players and owners on participating in WBC).
250. See Murray Chass, On Baseball; Pitching Judgment Has Been Spotty for the
Yankees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at 85 (describing original denial of license to
Cuba).
Just when baseball thought it was done with political interference (ster-
oids), politics has reared its ugly head and blocked Cuba's participation
in the inaugural World Baseball Classic. The Treasury Department has
informed Major League Baseball that Cuba cannot compete. In 1999,
the Cuban national team played a home-and-home series with the Balti-
more Orioles with the blessing of the Clinton administration. But the
Bush administration has a different view of Cuba. It can be seen clearly
from the statement of a Treasury Department spokeswoman, Molly Mil-
lerwise, in commenting on the rejection of a license for Cuba to play. She
referred to "the desperate and repressive Castro regime" and the "ordi-
nary Cubans who are forced to live in oppression under Castro's rule."
Id.
251. See Jesse Sanchez, Cuba Enjoys Truly Unique Experience (Mar. 19, 2006),
http://ww2.worldbaseballclassic.com/2006/news/article.jsp?ymd=20060319&con-
tent id=1355926&vkey=wbc-news&fext=.jsp&sid=wbc (describing experiences of
Cuban national team during their stay in San Diego).
252. See id. (reviewing Cuban athletes' experience in U.S. during WBC).
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happy. Look at their faces. I am so happy they can experience this
city."
2 53
Despite requiring full democracy in Cuba as a prerequisite for
normalized relations,254 the Bush administration initially attempted
to block Cuba's baseball team from witnessing U.S. democracy first-
hand. 25 5 "[A]llowing Cuba into the tournament seemed a logical
way for the United States to improve ties with the Cuban people
that might bear fruit for democracy later. ' 256 President Bush has
continuously noted that the choice resides with Fidel Castro to im-
prove diplomatic relations with the U.S.257 and President Bush reg-
ularly invokes an "us vs. them" mentality:258 "If Mr. Castro refuses
our offer, he will be protecting his cronies at the expense of his
people. ' '259  Although labeling his policy an initiative, President
Bush's doctrine for a democratic Cuba ironically requires nearly all
initiative not to be on the U.S., but on Cuba. President Bush's vi-
sion of Cuba has become increasingly bleak: his 2004 renewal of the
1996 national emergency with respect to Cuba declares it to be "a
state-sponsor of terrorism" and warns that "entry of any U.S.-regis-
tered vessels into Cuban territorial waters could result in... loss of
life ... due to the potential use of ... deadly force.., by the Cuban
military .... -260
While the political side-stepping and sound-byte remarks of the
Bush administration typify a U.S. bureaucratic ideology, the chal-
lenging, abrasive remarks from Cuban leader Fidel Castro are de-
monstrative of a communist body politic.2 6 1 Political progress
requires displacement of these destructive communications and the
wavelength of democracy is the logical candidate to initiate a dia-
logue. The political exchanges between the U.S. and Cuba in re-
sponse to the WBC exemplify a misalignment of two unilateral
discourses. Bush's indirect refusal of Cuban participation in the
253. Id.
254. See Remarks Announcing, supra note 102, at 853 ("Full normalization of
relations with Cuba... will only be possible when Cuba has a new government that
is fully democratic . . . ").
255. See A Diamond in March When Cuba's Team Comes to Bat in the Free World,
DAYTONA NEWS-JOURNAL CORP., Jan. 28, 2006, at 04A [hereinafter A Diamond in
March] (remarking on illogical stance of Bush's administration).
256. Id.
257. See Remarks Announcing, supra note 102, at 854 ("[T]he choice rests
with Mr. Castro.").
258. See id. (discussing Bush's attitude towards Cuba).
259. Id. (quoting President Bush).
260. Proclamation 7757, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 297 (Feb. 26, 2004).
261. See HOBERMAN, supra note 5, at 58 ("The fascist leader is, in short, an
athlete .... [H]e takes pride in the act of mastery itself.").
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WBC signifies a democratic discourse that seeks to bury the mis-
placed rationale in an ambiguous clump of generations-old regula-
tions; Castro's invocation of Hurricane Katrina tropes the
democratic failures of the Bush administration while simultane-
ously denying the capitalist-base for the U.S. licensing refusal.
Cuba seeks athletic competition to physically communicate its na-
tional strength; the U.S. seeks to deny Cuba economic prosperity
related to such competition in an effort to declare its hegemonic
power. Although both leaders' statements surrounding the WBC
symbolize their respective political systems, both fall on deaf ears.
The arena of sport potentially unites such otherwise divergent
discourses. Regardless of political setting or ideological language,
the game of baseball unites both entities under a singular frame-
work of rules: the rules of baseball. Although Castro's desire to play
in the WBC and Bush's desire to remove Cuba's opportunity to play
have differing political backgrounds, the actual act of playing itself
could go a long way toward aligning U.S. and Cuban discourse.
D. Future Implications For U.S. policy Via Sport
"Politics and sports don't mix." 262 Although sport "has no in-
trinsic political value,"263 it is an expressive product "of that soci-
ocultural system in which it occurs." 264 Sport pervades cultures
throughout space and time;265 thus, engagement in international
sport engenders engagement in international culture.
In the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. undertook sport ex-
change programs to produce cultural understanding and pacify po-
litical tensions. 266 The programs "served the broad interests of the
United States in its relations with other countries. ' 267 The interac-
tion between opposing nations "increased mutual understand-
ing."268 In its reports on the sport exchange programs, the State
Department remarked: "We believe that what is good for a new or
262. Guillermo I. Martinez, Castro's Iron Grip Reaches Into Puerto Rico, S. FL.
SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2006, at 23A (quoting event promoter at Puerto Rico-based
Cuban baseball game).
263. LowE, KANIN & STRENK, supra note 237, at v.
264. Id. at 23 (describing connection between sport and culture).
265. See id. at 11, 23 (reviewing sport in Greek culture, social structure of
Hopi Indians, Timbira tribe of Brazil and America, including Illinois subcultures).
266. See id. at 421-22 (reviewing cultural sports exchange programs).
267. Id. at 421 (quoting U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs: A Beacon of Hope - The Exchange-of-Persons Pro-
gram, 28 (1963)).
268. Id.
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developing country is good for the peace and stability of the
world." 269
In the 1970s, the U.S. State Department founded its cultural
programs under a functionalism doctrine. 270 The philosophy of
functionalism "postulates a basic and growing interdependence in
the world" and views "contacts between nations . . . as being more
important than their governmental structures."271 In a functional-
ist system, dependence on the state decreases as interdependence
on foreign networks increases. 272 As contact between nations in-
creases, and interdependence increases, economic, cultural and
physical bonds are formed. 273 As the number and strength of
bonds between nations increase, it becomes more costly for nations
to sever bonds through acts of violence and war.2 74 It follows, that
contact through international sports competitions "contributes to
international peace and understanding" because it builds interna-
tional bonds.275 Although "[s]ports can create conflict as well as
dissipate it . . ., [sports] may also rechannel conflict from higher
levels of confrontation in politics and armaments, to playing fields,
where it can be better regulated and controlled." 276
By creating the WBC, the MLB and the MLBPA renewed the
functionalist spirit that invigorated international sports during the
1960s and 1970s. 2 7 7 Unfortunately, OFAC was slower to get on the
functionalism bandwagon. 278 "One small bridge. One less sanc-
tion. One more chance for the two neighbors to play ball."
2 79
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering the deteriorating health and inevitable aging of
Fidel Castro,2 80 the present time offers an unprecedented opportu-
269. Id. at 422 (quoting Nicholas Rodis, The State Department's Athlete: A New
Look to Foreign Policy, AMATEUR ATHLETE, August 1964).
270. See id. at 472 (describing impact of functionalism on U.S. State Depart-
ment cultural programs of 1970s).
271. Id. (describing philosophy of functionalism).
272. See id. at 472 (assessing costs and benefits of functionalist system).
273. See id. (analyzing how bonds are formed between nations)
274. See id. at 473 (analyzing functionalism's impact on war).
275. See id. (examining how sports help build relationships between nations).
276. Id.
277. See Latin American Institute, supra note 240 (describing WBC as "the real
World Series").
278. See A Diamond in March, supra note 255, at 04A (illustrating political
downside to license denial).
279. Id.
280. See CNN.com, Castro Makes TV Appearance from Bed, http://www.cnn.
com/2006/WORLD/-americas/08/14/castro.cuba/index.html (on file with au-
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nity to the U.S. to foster diplomatic relations with Cuba to further
the forty-year goal of bringing democracy to the island nation.28'
Using sports as a bargaining chip in the game of international polit-
ics has historically been an unsuccessful maneuver. 28 2 Further-
more, political opposition to a single nation's participation in an
international event is futile without sufficient power.28 3 "Athletics
should be a field of sportsmanship and friendship, not a forum for
bullying and political one-upsmanship. 28 4
The U.S. does not possess the requisite multinational diplo-
matic backing in its stance on Cuba that it once did.2 5 U.S. policy
regarding Cuba may actually invert what was intended: the U.S. may
be isolated from international political support instead of Cuba.2 86
Nor does U.S. policy regarding Cuba possess the democratic gusto
of the era of its political inception.28 7 Although Cuba's national
team was permitted to participate upon reapplication for licensing
by World Baseball Classic, Inc., 288 the grant of permission was
prompted not by judicial review of the OFAC decision, but by pub-
lic forecast of political fallout resulting from the initial denial.2 9
The political balk between the U.S. and Cuba surrounding the
WBC pierced the shroud of unchecked administrative authority
that encompasses U.S. foreign policy. As with a balk in baseball, a
political balk brings forth consequences. 290 The controversy sur-
thor) (noting Castro's recovery from surgery and celebration of eightieth
birthday).
281. See Statement, supra note 101, at 1036 (reviewing decades-long struggle
for Cuban democracy).
282. See NAFZIGER, supra note 19, at 62 (reviewing general futility of economic
boycotts and relating economic boycotts to sports boycotts).
283. See id. at 61 ("Power is a driving force of policy.").
284. Editorial, Squeeze Play on Cuban Team, DENV. PosT, Dec. 19, 2005, at B07
(reviewing negative opinion of strong-arm U.S. policy regarding Cuba).
285. See Lutjens, supra note 15, at 7 (" [T] he United Nations General Assembly
has voted against U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba since 1992, yet the sanctions
continue."); Pettavino & Pye, supra note 229, at 152 (noting U.N. disapproval of
Cuban Democracy Act). "59-3 vote of the United Nations General Assembly for
the resolution calling for an end to the embargo." Id.
286. See Pettavino & Pye, supra note 231, at 152 (discussing possible conse-
quence of U.S. policy towards Cuba).
287. See generally Suanne C. Milligan, Comment, Another Inning in Cuban-
United States Relations, 2 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 281, 286-88 (1991) (describing
political climate of 1960s during institutionalization of CACR).
288. See generally Latin American Institute, supra note 240 (reviewing final
grant of permission for Cuban national team participation).
289. For a discussion on the alternative motivations for OFAC's reversal and
the potential political and economic fallout avoided by granting Cuba permission,
see supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
290. See Official Rules, supra note 1 (defining balk).
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rounding the WBC forced not only a national introspection upon
the current security of our foundational system of checks and bal-
ances, but also upon our own national ideological dialogue. In at-
tempting to shut the door on Cuban participation in the WBC,
OFAC revealed the policy-making process of the executive branch.
The U.S. political balk resulting from the Bush administration's
hard-line stance against Cuban participation in the WBC was an-
other event in our post-9/11 era demonstrating the need to review
the current status of our foundational system of checks and bal-
ances. Furthermore, the politicized diatribe between Bush and Cas-
tro shows that true diplomatic progress occurs through cultural
diffusion, typified by such international interactions as the WBC.
Perhaps our national ideology can progress through the window of
international sport, since the doorways to diplomatic political ex-
change seemingly remain closed, perhaps now more than ever.
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